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WILL DELAY RENTALS EXCUSE FAILURE TO
PROTECT AGAINST DRAINAGE?
ROGERS v. HESTON OIL CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rogers v. Heston Oil Co.,1 the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed
the long-standing Oklahoma doctrine regarding the effect of the lessor's
acceptance of delay rental payments on the lessee's implied covenant to
protect the leased premises against drainage. The old rule, enunciated in
Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty2 and reiterated in Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels,
3
dictated that the lessor's acceptance of delay rentals, with knowledge
that oil or gas was being drained from the leasehold at the time of accept-
ance, constituted a waiver of the lessor's right to maintain an action
against the lessee for breach of the implied covenant to protect against
drainage.4 A majority of other jurisdictions follow this approach.5 The
court in Rogers, however, overruled Eastern and Carter, rejected the ma-
jority rule, and held that "payment and acceptance of delay rental...
does not in and of itself constitute a waiver of an implied covenant on the
part of the lessee to protect the lessor from drainage."6 This Note will
examine the ramifications of the Rogers decision and compare the views
of various jurisdictions regarding the interdependence of the drilling de-
lay rental clause and the implied covenant to protect against drainage.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The implied covenant to protect against drainage7 provides that ab-
sent express lease provisions to the contrary, the oil and gas lessee must
protect the leased premises against drainage of substantial quantities of
oil or gas from a common reservoir caused by producing wells on adja-
1. 55 OKLA. B.J. 2124 (Oct. 16, 1984).
2. 71 Okla. 275, 278, 177 P. 104, 106 (1918).
3. 181 Okla. 218, 219, 73 P.2d 453, 455 (1937).
4. Eastern, 71 Okla. at 278, 177 P. at 106; Carter, 181 Okla. at 219, 73 P.2d at 455.
5. See generally, 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 826.2 (1977) (for a
discussion of effect of acceptance of delay rental payments).
6. Rogers, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2126.
7. The implied covenant to protect against drainage is referred to by some authorities as the
protection covenant, the drainage covenant, the offset well covenant, or the covenant for the protec-
tion of boundary lines. See, eg., 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 821; Cummings v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 116 W. Va. 599, -, 182 S.E. 789, 790 (1935).
1
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cent lands.8 In order to establish a breach of the covenant, the lessor
must prove that substantial drainage has occurred on the leasehold, and
that an offset well would probably be profitable, i.e., it would produce oil
or gas in quantities sufficient to repay the costs of drilling, completing,
equipping and operating the well, in addition to returning a reasonable
profit on the investment.9 The principal test ° applied in determining
whether the lessee has performed the obligations imposed by the implied
covenant to protect against drainage is the prudent operator standard-
whether a prudent operator would have drilled an offset well or taken
other action to protect against drainage.1 Some jurisdictions have al-
tered this standard slightly where it appears that the lessee is operating
the draining well himself.12
There are two distinct views regarding the effect of an acceptance of
delay rental payments13 on the implied covenant to protect against drain-
8. See, eg., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981); E. BROWN, THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 16.02 (rev. 2d ed. 1984); R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 8.1 (1971); 5 E. KuNTZ, THE LAW OF OIL AND GA § 61.1 (1978); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 5 § 821; Meyers & Williams, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases: Drain-
age Caused by the Lessee, 40 TEX. L. REv. 923 (1962).
9. 5 E. KuNTz, supra note 8; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 822; Woodruff,
Lessees Under Siege: Recent Cases Involving Attempts to Terminate Producing Leases, 32 INST. ON
OIL AND GAS L. AND TAx'N. 187, 202 (1981).
10. Two other tests have been used on occasion: (1) the good faith judgment of the lessee test,
where the lessee may be held to have breached his implied duty to protect the leased premises against
drainage if he did not act in good faith in deciding whether to drill an offset well. Lawrence Oil
Corp. v. Metcalfe, 241 Ky. 353, -, 43 S.W.2d 986, 989 (1931); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
Co. v. Haynes Drilling Co., 180 Okla. 419, 431, 69 P.2d 624, 636, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736 (1937);
Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872, reh'g denied, 10 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1928); and (2) the profit-
ability of an offset well as a factor, where the determination of whether the lessee has performed the
obligations imposed by the implied duty to protect the leased premises against drainage depends at
least in part upon whether there was a reasonable probability that the drilling of an offset well would
have been profitable for the lessee. Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 981 (10th Cir.
1977) (applying New Mexico law); Elliott v. Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill. 2d 146, -, 139 N.E.2d 295, 299
(1956); Park v. Young, 261 Ky. 367, -, 87 S.W.2d 963, 966 (1935); Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 50, 120 P.2d 349, 354 (1943); Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla.
275, 278, 177 P. 104, 106 (1918); Haken v. Harper Oil Co., 600 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Okla. Ct. App.
1979); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981).
11. See, eg., Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59, 63 (10th Cir. 1930) (applying Oklahoma law);
Renner v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 187 Kan. 158, -, 354 P.2d 326, 344 (1960); Deep Rock Oil Corp.
v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 433, 186 P.2d 823, 826 (1947); Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 279,
177 P. 104, 108 (1918); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, -, 6 S.W.2d 1031,
1035-36 (1928).
12. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
13. Delay rental payments are payments of a stipulated sum of money from the lessee to the
lessor in periodic installments for the privilege of postponing the drilling of an initial well during the
primary term of the lease; these payments have the effect of negating the implied covenant to drill an
exploratory well. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5.
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:456
age.14 The older, majority rule states that the lessor's acceptance of delay
rental payments constitutes a waiver of the right to bring an action for
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage," if at the
time of acceptance the lessor knew that the drainage was occurring 1 6
The new, minority view that acceptance of delay rental payments does
not, in and of itself, waive the right to recover for breach of the implied
covenant to protect against drainage17 seems to be gaining noteworthy
acceptance. 18
Jurisdictions that embrace the majority view, and thus are more re-
luctant to attach drainage liability to the lessee,19 create an exception and
thereby impose liability when the lessee is draining the leasehold from a
contiguous tract. The so-called "fraudulent drainage" decisions fall into
three broad categories:2
(1) Cases where the court considered the drainage
unimportant, 2 1
(2) Cases where the court held that fraudulent drainage did not
alter the ordinary rules of liability,22 and
14. Id.; Woodruff, supra note 9; Jones, Rights and Remediesfor Non-Development and Failure
to Offset (Legal.Aspects), 4 ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAX'N. 57 (1953).
15. Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59, 63 (10th Cir. 1930); Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212
F. Supp. 332, 335 (D. Wyo. 1963); Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co., 5 F. Supp. 818, 820 (W.D. La.
1932); Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 258 Ala. 326, -, 62 So. 2d 783, 790 (1953); Carson v. Ozark Natural
Gas Co., 191 Ark. 167, -, 83 S.W.2d 833, 835 (1935); Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160
Ark. 574,-, 255 S.W. 7, 8 (1923); Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Williams, 249 Ky. 242, -,
60 S.W.2d 580, 583 (1933); Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687,-, 48 So. 2d 344, 348-
49 (1950); Deep Rock Oil Co. v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 432, 186 P.2d 823, 826 (1947); Carter Oil Co.
v. Samuels, 181 Okla. 218, 220, 73 P.2d 453, 455 (1937); Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275,
278, 177 P. 104, 106 (1918); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, -, 89 S.E. 12, 16
(1916); Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, -, 90 S.E. 344, 345 (1916).
16. Although one case implies that acceptance of delay rentals by a lessor who does not know
of the drainage will not prevent enforcement of the implied covenant to protect against drainage (Orr
v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59, 63 (10th Cir. 1930)), there are apparently no cases where the presence
or absence of the lessor's knowledge was the determinative factor. Most of the cases apply the rule
in terms of acceptance with knowledge of drainage. See Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160
Ark. 574, -, 255 S.W. 7, 8 (1923); Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels, 181 Okla. 218, 220, 73 P.2d 453, 455
(1937).
17. Rogers v. Heston Oil Co., 55 OKLA. B.J. 2124 (Oct. 16, 1984); Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7
S.W.2d 872, reh'g denied, 10 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); see generally 5 E. KUNTZ, supra
note 8, § 61.2; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5.
18. See supra note 17 and cases and authorities cited therein.
19. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
20. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEY-
ERS, supra note 5, § 824; see also, Woodruff, supra note 9 at 203; 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 61.2.
21. Billeaud Planters v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 245 F.2d 14, 18 (5th Cir. 1957); Gerson v,
Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444, 445 (10th Cir. 1945); Chapman v. Sohio Petroleum
Co., 297 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
22. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1946); Hutchins v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 161 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
3
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(3) Cases where the court judged the draining lessee by a more
rigorous standard.23
III. ROGERS V HESTON OIL CO.2 4 -THE NEW OKLAHOMA RULE
A. Summary of Facts
Rogers sued Heston Oil Company for damages arising from Hes-
ton's alleged breach of the implied covenant to protect the leased prem-
ises against drainage, specifically Heston's producing well on a
contiguous lease that allegedly drained Rogers' tract.25  The Seminole
County District Court granted Heston's motion for summary judgment
because Rogers had accepted delay rentals. The Oklahoma Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court's ruling.26
Rogers granted an oil and gas lease on her property. The original
lessee subsequently assigned the lease to Heston Oil Company and its co-
defendant, Marsh Oil and Gas Company.27 The lease stipulated a three
year primary term and an "unless" type delay rental clause,28 which pro-
vided that if the first well drilled on the lease resulted in a dry hole, delay
rentals would not be due again until 12 months after the expiration of the
last rental period for which delay rentals had been paid.29 In effect, the
lessee's drilling of a dry hole would substitute for its having to pay delay
rental payments in the lease year succeeding the year for which the lessee
had last paid delay rentals.
30
Eight months after Rogers leased her property, the defendants com-
pleted a commercially producing well on adjacent unpooled acreage, a
scant 330 feet from the common boundary line.31 The defendants, who
held the lease and operated the well on the adjacent tract,32 had not yet
23. Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1977) (in a common lessee
case, proof of drainage is all that is required; the reasonably prudent operator test is inapplicable);
Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, -, 158 P.2d 754, 758 (1945)
(profitability of protection well is immaterial); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, -, 72
So. 2d 176, 183 (1954) (common lessee strictly liable for substantial drainage caused by his own
affirmative acts).




28. Id. An "unless" type drilling delay rental clause provides that a failure to make timely
payment or tender of delay rentals will result in a termination of the lease. By comparison, the "or"
type drilling delay rental clause provides that a failure to make timely payment or tender of delay
rentals renders the lease subject to forfeiture at the option of the lessor. 3 E. KuNTz, supra note 8,
§ 34.5.
29. 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2124-25.
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pursued any drilling activity on the plaintiff's lease.33
As the lease required,34 the defendants paid delay rentals for the
second lease year by depositing the payment in the plaintiff's bank ac-
count when the payment became due.35 The district court deemed the
plaintiff to have accepted the payment when the defendants deposited it
in her account. During the same lease year, however, the defendants
drilled a dry hole, the Morgan well, on the plaintiff's lease.36 Conse-
quently, the lease required no further delay rental payments until 12
months after the expiration of the last rental period, or during the third
lease year.37
When the plaintiff discovered the producing well on the adjacent
tract during the second lease year, she demanded in writing that defend-
ants either drill a protection well 38 or pay her an offset royalty.39 De-
fendants did not respond to the plaintiff's demand, but paid a delay
rental payment for the third lease year, a payment which was not then
due to the plaintiff because the dry Morgan well had already secured for
the defendants the right to delay drilling during the third lease year.4°
Again, the payment was implicitly accepted by the plaintiff when it was
deposited into her bank account. 41 When the defendants ignored a sec-
ond written demand for a protection well or offset royalties, the plaintiff
sued.42
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment based on the well-established rule of Carter Oil Co. v. Samuel, 43
that the lessor's acceptance of delay rental payments with knowledge
that oil or gas is being drained at the time payment is made constitutes a






38. Id. A protection well, also referred to as an offset well, is a well drilled on a lease to "pro-
tect" or "offset" drainage caused by a well on an adjacent tract. Because of the fugacious nature of
oil and gas, they may migrate from their normal position to one of less pressure, i.e., where the earth
has been pierced by a producing well. See generally 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW-MANUAL op TERMS (1984).
39. 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2125. An offset royalty is compensation paid by the lessee to the lessor to
"offset" or "compensate" for the minerals which have been extracted by the draining well. See
generally 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 38, at 568.
40. 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2125.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 181 Okla. 218, 73 P.2d 453 (1937).
[Vol. 20:456
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the premises against drainage.' The Oklahoma Court of Appeals agreed
that Carter was determinative of the matter and affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment.45 On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
versed the Rogers decision, explicitly overruling Carter and "the cases
subsequently likewise so holding."
46
B. The Issue
The preliminary factual determination before the Rogers court was
simply whether the plaintiff may be considered to have "accepted" '47 the
payment of delay rentals for a period when they were not due,4 8 thus
waiving her right to maintain an action against the defendants for breach
of the implied covenant to protect against drainage.' If the court found
that the plaintiff had "accepted" a gratuitous delay rental, thereby waiv-
ing her action for failure to protect against drainage, it would then appar-
ently face the secondary issue, i.e., whether Oklahoma would accord any
significance to the fact that the defendants caused the very drainage that
they failed to mitigate with an offset well, so-called "fraudulent
drainage."'
The court could have reversed defendants' summary judgment and
still retained the Carter rule either by finding that a lessor is legally inca-
pable of "accepting" an unrequired delay rental and thus had waived
nothing, or by holding that, notwithstanding an otherwise valid waiver,
the draconian rule of Carter does not protect a lessee who is the perpetra-
tor of the unprotected drainage. Instead of using these narrow methods
to circumscribe Carter, the court chose to overrule it by framing the issue
in a manner which was broader than the facts warranted:
[Whether an oil and gas lessor, by accepting payment of delay rentals,
even if timely made in accordance with the terms of the lease contract,
with knowledge on the part of the lessor that oil or gas is being drained
from his premises at the time that payment is made, thereby waives his
right to recover damages for such drainage during the time covered by
44. Id. at 219, 73 P.2d at 455. Accord, Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104
(1918).
45. 55 OKLA. BJ. at 2124.
46. Id. at 2127.
47. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. Generally, when the lease provides that payment
of delay rentals may be made by deposit in a specified bank to the credit of the lessor, the payment is
presumed to be accepted when the deposit is made. 3 E. KuNrZ, supra note 8, § 34.4(e).
48. The delay rentals were not due for the third lease year because of the previously drilled dry
hole. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
49. 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2125.
50. Id. at 2127. The Rogers court did not use the term "fraudulent drainage" as such, but it did
modify the "prudent operator" standard to make it applicable to fraudulent drainage situations.
1985]
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the delay rental payment.
Addressing the issue in this manner inevitably cast doubt on the holdings
in Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty52 and Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels,"3 compelling
the court to ask the broader question
whether the implied covenant of protection against drainage, thus in-
cluded within the lease agreement, is a separate and independent cove-
nant from the delay rental covenant, so that the payment and
acceptance of delay rentals under the written terms of the lease by the
lessor with knowledge of drainage by adjacent or adjoining producing
leases in and of itself constitutes a waiver of the implied covenant. 4
The question of the relationship between the two covenants lead the
court to re-examine the theoretical bases of the implied covenant to pro-
tect against drainage, the implied covenant to develop the lease, and the
delay rental clause."
C. Oklahoma Law Prior to Rogers
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized the implied covenant to
protect against drainage in Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty.56 Eastern involved
two distinct classifications of delay rental payments-those that the les-
sor had accepted and those that the lessor had refused. 7 As to the pe-
riod for which the lessor had accepted delay rentals, 58 the court
summarily dismissed the lessor's claim for damages arising from the
lessee's failure to protect the leased premises from drainage.5 9 The East-
ern court followed a 1916 West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals deci-
sion, Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co.,6' which appeared to the Eastern
court to be "sound and to accord with the highest sense of justice and
right. ' 61 The lessor in Carper could not recover damages62 for drainage
that he suffered by reason of the lessee's failure to drill offset wells during
the period covered by payments made and accepted in lieu of drilling a
51. Rogers, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2126.
52. 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104 (1918).
53. 181 Okla. 218, 73 P.2d 453 (1937).
54. Rogers, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2127.
55. Id
56. 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104 (1918).
57. Id. at 276, 177 P. at 105.
58. The delay rentals had been accepted after the lessor had demanded that the lessee drill an
offset well. Id.
59. Id.
60. 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916).
61. Eastern, 71 Okla. at 277-78, 177 P. at 106.
62. In West Virginia at the time of the Carper case, the remedy for breach of the implied
covenant to protect against drainage was damages, not forfeiture. Id.; see also Stanley v. United Fuel
Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, -, 90 S.E. 344, 345 (1916).
[Vol. 20:456
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well (i.e., drilling delay rental payments).63 The Eastern court found the
Carper result to be particularly attractive, stating:
The lessor [in Carper] having accepted the agreed compensation for
delay in operations, manifestly he should not be permitted to recover
in addition thereto as damages the value of his share of the oil and gas
drained from the leased premises during the time covered by such pay-
ments. . . . They [the plaintiff-lessor in Eastern] accepted payments
for delay subsequent to giving that notice and making that demand,
and thereby clearly waived any right which they may have had to
claim a forfeiture" for failure to drill an offset well, and thereby pro-
tect against drainage during the time covered by the payments
accepted ... 65
Not only did the Eastern decision recognize the existence of an im-
plied covenant to protect against drainage, but it also marked the begin-
ning of Oklahoma's adherence to the majority rule that payment and
acceptance of drilling delay rentals constitutes a waiver of the right to
recover for breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage.
6
The Eastern court's handling of the second disputed period of delay
rental payments, those that the lessee had tendered but that the lessor
had refused pursuant to his previous notice and demand for a protection
well, demonstrates that the waiver operated only during the period cov-
ered by the accepted delay rentals. The court stated:
The lessors, having refused to accept the payment due and tendered on
that day for further delay, and adhered to the notice then given of their
intention to accept no payments thereafter for that purpose, it cannot
be held that they have waived any remedy they may have had on ac-
count of failure of the lessee to protect the premises against such subse-
quent drainage.6
7
63. Carper, 78 W. Va. at-, 89 S.E. at 17.
64. The appropriate remedy in Oklahoma for breach of the implied covenant to protect against
drainage was forfeiture rather than damages. Indiana Oil, Gas & Dev. Co. v. McCrory, 42 Okla.
136, 140 P. 610 (1914); Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Whitesides, 71 Okla. 41, 174 P. 573 (1918) But
see Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, 90 S.E. 344 (1916) (appropriate remedy in West
Virginia was damages, not forfeiture).
65. Eastern, 71 Okla. at 275, 177 P. at 106.
66. Id. ("[Inn view of the express provisions of the lease, it would seem doubtful if a covenant to
protect the premises against drainage can be implied during the period that payment for delay in
drilling a well may be made.").
67. Id. The holding was based on Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12
(1916):
The rule announced in that case is that there is an implied condition that, in the event of
such drainage or imminent danger thereof, the lessee will, upon demand of the lessor, drill
a well on the leased premises for the prevention of loss of the subject-matter of the lease
within the last period for which delay rental has been paid or shall be accepted, or com-
mence one within said period and diligently prosecute the work on it, accompanied by
notice of intention to refuse to receive further payment of rentals and declare forfeiture of
the lease for failure to drill the same.
1985]
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Although the Eastern court recognized the viability of such a cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage,
it did not "feel disposed to adopt it"' 68 under the facts presented. The
court reasoned that, although the implied covenant to protect against
drainage might arise when the lessor demands a protection well and gives
notice that he will refuse future delay rental payments, still "there must
be actual or threatened drainage in a substantial sense."69 After examin-
ing the prevailing economic conditions, the doubtful profitability of an
offset well, and the prudent operator standard, the court decided that
"[w]hatever may have been the obligation of the lessee to protect the
premises against drainage, under these circumstances it surely cannot be
said that there was drainage in a substantial sense, that the obligation to
prevent same by drilling an offset arose. ."o Thus the court denied
recovery against Eastern Oil Co.71
The holding in Eastern, therefore, requires that the lessor give notice
of his intention to refuse future delay rental payments and that he de-
mand that the lessee drill a protection well as a prerequisite to recovery
for breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage.72 If the
lessee then refuses to drill a protection well and the lessor sues, then the
lessor must still prove the two essential elements of a cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage: substantial
drainage, and the probability that a protection well would be profitable."
In the 66 years since the Eastern decision,74 apparently only one
other reported Oklahoma case has turned on the interplay of the delay
rental clause with the implied covenant to protect against drainage. In
1937, the supreme court decided Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels7 5 and reiter-
ated the majority rule on facts very similar to the Rogers facts.76 The
Carter lessee paid delay rentals for two consecutive lease years, which
payments were deposited in the lessor's bank account as the lease pro-
Eastern, 71 Okla. at 278, 177 P. at 107 (citing Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E.
12 (1916)).
68. Id. at 279, 177 P. at 107.
69. Id
70. Id at 280, 177 P. at 108.
71. Id
72. Id at 278, 177 P. at 107.
73. Id. at 279, 177 P. at 107.
74. The Eastern rule remained viable in Oklahoma until it was overruled in Rogers v. Heston
Oil Co., 55 OKLA. B.J. 2124 (Oct. 16, 1984).
75. 181 Okla. 218, 73 P.2d 453 (1937).
76. Rogers, 55 OKLA. B.J. 2124.
[Vol. 20:456
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vided.77 Meanwhile, the lessee had drilled two wells on an adjacent tract
that the lessee had also leased.78 When the lessor discovered that one of
the wells on the adjacent lease was draining his property, he demanded
that the lessee drill a protection well or pay him an offset royalty.79
Although the lessee had already drilled two wells on the lessor's tract,
neither well offset the draining well and neither produced in paying
quantities. °
The plaintiff secured a judgment at trial.81 On appeal, however, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed,82 relying on Eastern Oil Co. v.
Beatty.83 In so holding, the Court stated:
[I]t has been held by this court that if the lessor accepts the payment of
delay rentals with knowledge that oil or gas is being drained from his
premises at the time the payment is made, he waives his right to com-
plain of the drainage during the time covered by such payment.84
Thus, the court refused to award damages to the plaintiff for the lessee's
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage because the
lessor accepted the payment of delay rentals with knowledge that oil and
gas were being drained at the time.85
Oklahoma thereby adopted the rule which a majority of jurisdic-
tions follow. 86 Subsequent Oklahoma cases have followed Eastern and
77. Carter, 181 Okla. at 219, 73 P.2d at 454.
78. Id. Various other wells had been drilled, apparently by other parties, on leases surrounding
the plaintiff's land, but with these the plaintiff was unconcerned.
79. Id. For a discussion of protection wells and offset royalties, see supra notes 38-39.
80. Carter, 181 Okla. at 219, 73 P.2d at 454.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104 (1918).
84. Carter, 181 Okla. at 219, 73 P.2d at 455 (citing Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177
P. 104 (1918)).
85. Id. at 219, 73 P.2d at 455. The threshold determination to be made in Carter was whether
or not the lessor had "accepted" the payment of delay rentals; since both parties agreed that had the
payments been accepted, the Eastern rule would bar plaintiff's recovery. The court stated the test for
payment and acceptance:
Where it is stipulated in the lease that the lessee may make payment by deposit in a speci-
fied bank to the credit of the lessor, the acceptance of such payment is implied by this
agreement when the deposit is made pursuant to the stipulation. If the lessor does not wish
to accept the delay rentals, it is his duty to give notice to the lessee, before the rental
becomes due, that it will not be accepted.
Id. at 219, 73 P.2d at 455 (citing McNutt v. Whitney, 192 Ky. 132, 232 S.W. 386 (1921)). The court
also cited Satterfield v. Galloway, 192 Ky. 780, 234 S.W. 448 (1921) (notice to the bank to refuse to
accept rental payments prior to time when payment is due is not sufficient); and Kachelmacher v.
Laird, 92 Ohio St. 324, 110 N.E. 933 (1915) (when rentals are paid to the bank the fund becomes
property of the lessor, and the lessor cannot avoid such effect by refusing to withdraw the sum from
the bank). Id. at 219-20, 73 P.2d at 455.
86. See, eg., Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 258 Ala. 326, 62 So. 2d 783 (1953); Carson v. Ozark
Natural Gas Co., 191 Ark. 167, 83 S.W.2d 833 (1935); Hood v. Southern Prod. Co., 206 La. 642, 19
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Carter in the proper circumstances.8 7
D. The Rogers Decision
The Rogers court's decision of the waiver issue was straightforward:
a lessor cannot be considered to have accepted drilling delay rental pay-
ments that were not due at the time they were paid, 8 and thus no waiver
of rights under the implied covenant to protect against drainage could
have occurred. 9 Using only this theory, the court could have distin-
guished Rogers from both Eastern and Carter, because, in the latter cases,
delay rentals were due when paid and accepted.90 By drawing a distinc-
tion between the payment and acceptance of agreed delay rentals with
knowledge of actual drainage occurring at the time,91 and a gratuitous
payment completely outside the scope of the rights and obligations of the
parties to the lease,92 the court could have resolved the waiver issue in
favor of the plaintiff without overruling the long-standing Eastern and
Carter doctrine.
Another way the court could have salvaged Eastern and Carter,
while reversing the lower court's summary judgment for the Rogers
lessee, would have been to create an exception in cases involving "fraud-
ulent drainage." The court could have, for example, recognized that
when the lessee himself causes the drainage, he is held to a higher stan-
dard. Such a decision would require overruling or modifying only the
part of the Carter holding which appeared to place no particular signifi-
cance on the fact that the lessee himself- operated the draining well.93
The Rogers court chose not to do so, preferring instead to reconsider the
validity of the Eastern and Carter doctrine and, ultimately, to overrule
those cases entirely.94
So. 2d 336 (1944); Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, 90 S.E. 344 (1916); see also cases
cited supra notes 15-16.
87. See Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59, 63 (10th Cir. 1930) (applying Oklahoma law). But
cf Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 434, 186 P.2d 823, 826 (1947) (lessor entitled to
damages upon a showing that there was no "acceptance" of delay rental payments).
88. Rogers, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2126. Delay rentals were not due for the third lease year because
of the dry Morgan well drilled during the second lease year. Id. at 2125.
89. Id at 2126. Acceptance is crucial to the waiver issue. The court noted that "in order to
constitute a waiver, there must be an actual intention to relinquish a known right. . . ." Id. at 2126
(quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Schrimsher, 179 Okla. 643, 66 P.2d 945 (1937)). The court went on to
say that "if the plaintiff 'accepted' the payment (an issue we need not here decide) no waiver is
attributable to plaintiff, because the plaintiff simply did not have a right to be waived." Id.
90. See Eastern, 71 Okla. at 276, 177 P. at 105; Carter, 181 Okla. at 219, 73 P.2d at 454.
91. E g., as in Eastern and Carter.
92. E.g., as in Rogers.
93. Carter, 181 Okla. at 220, 73 P.2d at 455.
94. Rogers, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2127.
[Vol. 20:456
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW OKLAHOMA RULE
The court in Rogers held that the lessor's acceptance of delay rental
payments with knowledge that drainage is occurring at the time of ac-
ceptance does not in and of itself constitute a waiver of the lessor's right
to recover damages for breach of the implied covenant to protect against
drainage.95 The court based its conclusion on its perception of the "fun-
damental injustice"96 that resulted from mechanical application of the
old rule. Although courts outside Oklahoma disagree on what is funda-
mentally just in weighing the effect of the lessor's acceptance of delay
rental payments on the lessee's duty to protect against drainage,97 the
clear weight of authority favors the view that the lessor's acceptance of
delay rental payments with knowledge that drainage is occurring bars his
enforcement of the implied covenant to protect against drainage during
the period covered by the rental payment. 98
A. The Rationale and Application of the Majority Rule
One rationale for the older, majority rule is that the lessor has
elected to accept delay rentals as liquidated damages99 for the minerals
that the draining well extracts. 1°° In effect, this approach considers the
delay rental clause to be a limitation on both the implied covenant to
drill an exploratory well 01 and the implied covenant to protect against
drainage.102 Viewed another way, the lessor should not be entitled to
both a well and a delay rental on the same lease at the same time. Since
drilling a protection well would satisfy both the exploration covenant and
the protection covenant,103 and since paying delay rentals satisfies the
95. Id. at 2128.
96. Id. at 2127.
97. See generally 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5.
98. See supra notes 15-16 and cases cited therein; see also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 5; E. BROWN, supra note 8; and 5 E. KUNrz, supra note 8.
99. Typically, delay rentals are not large enough to compensate for the actual loss of minerals
through extraction; however, the fact that potential damages at the time the lease is negotiated are so
speculative, the courts are willing to consider delay rentals as liquidated damages.
100. See infra note 102.
101. If the oil and gas lease ddes not contain some provision to the contrary, there is an implied
obligation on the part of the lessee to drill an exploratory well. The lease is in jeopardy of cancella-
tion by the lessor if the lessee fails to do so within a reasonable time after demand by the lessor. 3 E.
KuNTz, supra note 8, § 27.1.
102. See, eg., Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels, 181 Okla. 218, 73 P.2d 453 (1937); Eastern Oil Co. v.
Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104 (1918); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12
(1916).
103. As noted in Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. at 278, 177 P. at 106:
Drainage can be prevented only by drilling offset wells, and what has been said with refer-
ence to an implied covenant to develop. . . would seem logically to apply to an implied
1985]
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obligation to drill an exploratory well, these courts reason that payment
of delay rentals also satisfies the protection covenant' °4 and treat the les-
sor as having made an election to accept the rentals and waive the right
to any well, exploratory or protection. 105
Many of the decisions recognizing the majority rule rely on a waiver
or estoppel theory; 10 6 the seeming injustice of permitting a lessor to re-
ceive the delay rental, while still holding the lessee liable for drainage
occurring during the period covered by delay rentals."7
The courts which follow the majority position permit the lessor to
enforce the implied covenant to protect against drainage only after noti-
fying the lessee of the breach, demanding performance, and refusing fu-
ture delay rental payments.10 Under these constraints, the lessor could
suffer substantial drainage until the due date of the next delay rental pay-
ment, during which time he would be helpless to remedy the drainage.'0 9
Most of the decisions following the majority rule have found or assumed
that the lessor knew of the drainage at the time he accepted the delay
rental payments. 0 Dicta in one case, 111 however, indicates that accept-
covenant to protect the premises from drainage by wells drilled upon adjacent land within
said term.
104. See, eg., Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921); Carper v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916).
105. 5 E. KutNirz, supra note 8; cf Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1930) (where
lessor who accepts delay rentals, after the necessity for offset is known, he waives performance of
implied covenant to drill offset).
106. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160 Ark. 574, -, 255 S.W. 7, 8 (1923).
The principle is elemental that one party to a contract who, with knowledge of a breach by
the other party, continues to accept benefits under the contract, and suffers the other party
to continue in performance thereof, waives the right to insist on the breach.... When a
party accepts rentals with full knowledge of the breach, he impliedly consents to further
delay, notwithstanding the breach, and cannot thereafter claim a forfeiture or sue for dam-
ages on account of the delay.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. This theory presumes that delay rentals are a modification of the implied covenant to pro-
tect against drainage.
108. See, eg., Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co., 5 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La. 1932); Satterfield v.
Galloway, 192 Ky. 780, 234 S.W. 448 (1921); McNutt v. Whitney, 192 Ky. 132, 232 S.W. 386
(1921); Deep Rock Oil Co. v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 186 P.2d 823 (1947); Carter Oil Co. v. Samuels,
181 Okla. 218, 73 P.2d 453 (1937); Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, 90 S.E. 344
(1916); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916).
109. See supra note 108.
110. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
111. That a lessor who accepts delay rentals, before necessity for offset drilling has arisen or
without knowledge of such necessity, does not waive a breach of the implied covenant to
drill offset wells; but, a lessor who accepts delay rentals, after the necessity for such offset
drilling has arisen and is known to him, waives the performance of the implied covenant to
drill offset wells during the period for which such delay rentals are accepted.
It follows that the breach, if any there was, of the implied covenant to drill offset
wells, was waived by the acceptance of delay rentals.
Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59, 63 (10th Cir. 1930). It should be noted that the status of Orr is
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ance of delay rental payments by a lessor who does not know of the
drainage will not bar enforcement of the implied covenant to protect
against drainage.112
B. Minority Rule Rationale
Few cases 1 3 espouse the minority view that the lessor may accept
the delay rentals with knowledge of occurring drainage yet still maintain
an action against the lessee for breach of the implied covenant to protect
against drainage." 4 The rationale of the minority rule, however, rests
upon sounder reasoning than that of the majority rule.
First, the minority rule comports with the parties' expectations.
Typically, the lessor executing a lease that contains a delay rental clause
anticipates that the lessee will not drill an exploratory well as long as the
lessee pays drilling delay rentals. 5 Delay rentals merely postpone the
profits that the lessor hopes to realize from production of minerals be-
neath his land,I 6 a detriment that he is willing to accept in return for the
delay rental payments. The lessor probably does not anticipate that the
same delay rental will allow his lessee, the putative protector of the les-
sor's interests, to ignore a neighboring well that is draining the lessor's
mineral reserves.1 17 In such a case, the lessor's profit is not postponed,
but lost altogether. 8 The majority rule thus becomes a trap for the un-
wary or trusting lessor. Consequently, some courts now apply a more
balanced rule, recognizing the drilling delay rental clause as a limitation
only on the implied drilling covenant, or the express drilling clause if one
is contained in the lease,119 but not on the lessee's duty to protect the
premises against drainage. 120
unclear in light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Rogers, because in Orr the 10th Cir-
cuit applied Oklahoma law.
112. Although the majority rule cases tend to base their decisions on the lessor's knowledge of
the drainage, 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, note that the authors "have found no
cases where such term became important, that is, where the lessor accepted rentals without knowl-
edge of drainage."
113. See, e.g., Rogers v. Heston Oil Co., 55 OKLA. B.J. 2124 (Oct. 16, 1984); Texas Co. v.
Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872, rehg denied, 10 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Carper v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916).
114. See generally 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 826.2.
115. In other words, the lessor recognizes the delay rental clause as a limitation on drilling only.
116. For a discussion of this point, see Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 278-79, 177 P.
104, 106-07 (1918).
117. This situation assumes there are no express lease provisions to the contrary regarding offset
wells, nor a provision for offset or compensatory royalties.
118. See supra notes 5 and 8.
119. See supra note 113.
120. As the Rogers court noted, the covenants are totally independent (Le., the implied covenant
1985]
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Second, the minority rule follows well-established oil and gas con-
tract construction principles. Courts generally construe oil and gas
leases so as to promote development. 121 The primary goal of the parties
to the lease is production, hopefully resulting in profit. A construction
that permits the lessee to ignore the draining away of the subject matter
of the contract frustrates the agreement's purpose. It is more consistent
with the parties' intent to require the lessee to perform under the implied
covenant to protect against drainage in spite of his payment of delay
rentals. In an effort to make a construction argument, a number of ma-
jority rule cases have asserted that an express clause relating to the drill-
ing of wells precludes the implied convenant to drill a protection well. 122
These decisions have stated that the written provision contains the
lessee's entire obligation with respect to drilling of any kind; therefore,
no implied covenant to prevent drainage is recognized because it would
conflict with an express lease provision.1 23 Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Christian124 explains the tautology of this argument:
The implied covenant to drill offset wells for protection of the property
from drainage is a distinct obligation from the obligation imposed by
the implied covenant to develop the property. They are two separate
and distinct covenants. The express stipulation against, or the full per-
formance of, the obligation of the lessee to develop the property will
not relieve the obligation to protect against drainage. 125
Other courts have reached the same conclusion.1 26
Third, the evolution of the oil and gas lease supports the minority
theory of the independence of the exploratory and protection obliga-
tions. 127 Scholars teach that the delay rental clause originally substituted
for the implied covenant to drill an exploratory well but had no bearing
to drill an exploratory well and the implied covenant to protect against drainage). Delay relates to
development; the protection covenant relates to drainage. There is no reason to treat the implied
covenant to protect against drainage as a modification of the development covenant. 55 OKLA. B.J.
at 2127.
121. See eg., Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
122. Jackson v. Texas Co., 75 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1935); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil
Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); Hughes v. Busseyville Oil & Gas Co., 180 Ky. 545, 203
S.W. 515 (1918); Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Christian, 83 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
123. See supra note 122.
124. 83 S.W.2d at 408.
125. Id. at 409.
126. Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Jones v. Interstate Oil Corp.,
115 Cal. App. 302, 1 P.2d 1051 (1931); Rogers v. Heston Oil Co., 55 OKLA. B.J. 2124 (Oct. 16,
1984); Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943); Jackson v. Texas Co., 75 F.2d 549 (10th
Cir. 1935).
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on the implied covenant to protect against drainage.12 The weight of
authority agrees.129 It is important to note, however, that those cases
simply hold that the delay rental clause standing alone is compatible with
the implied covenant to protect against drainage. The cases do not hold
that a lessor can accept rentals and still maintain a suit for drainage.
Fraudulent drainage of the type in Rogers, exacerbates the inequities
of the majority rule. Under the majority rule, if a lessee holds adjacent
leases and can efficiently drain the entire formation with a single strategi-
cally placed well, he has absolutely no incentive to incur the expense of
drilling a protection well on the adjacent tract. Furthermore, he is under
no obligation to compensate the lessor of the adjacent property for the
minerals drained. The majority rule leaves the lessor without recourse
because, so long as the lessee has paid delay rentals, he has not breached
the lease. Clearly, the Rogers rule creates a more equitable result: the
implied covenant to protect against drainage is an overriding obligation
that endures regardless of the manner in which minerals are affected.1 30
Payment of delay rentals or even actual production have no effect on the
implied covenant to protect against drainage; the duty to offset the drain-
ing well remains. Even actual production in tremendous volumes from a
non-offset well does not discharge the duty to protect against drainage.
For several reasons, the more sensible rule is to confine the palliative
operation of delay rentals to the implied covenant to drill an exploratory
well. Age alone cannot justify adherence to the majority rule; a rule
which defeats the parties' expectations, contradicts oil and gas contract
construction, and disregards history. Oklahoma should have renounced
the majority rule long ago, especially in cases of fraudulent drainage as in
Carter and Rogers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rogers court ended Oklahoma's 66 year affair with the majority
rule that the lessor's acceptance of delay rental payments bars his action
for breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage. The court
rejected the opportunity to decide Rogers on narrow factual distinctions.
It proceeded to overrule two of its prior decisions and to separate the
covenant to develop, which the payment of delay rentals may satisfy tem-
porarily, from the implied covenant to protect against drainage, which
128. Id. § 811.
129. See supra note 15.
130. 55 OKLA. B.J. at 2124.
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the payment of delay rentals can never satisfy. The decision accords with
the historical development of the oil and gas lease and fosters the lessee's
and lessor's mutual goal of production from the lease.
Cynthia LeMay
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